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ABSTRACT 
Three experiments investigated infants’ understanding of authority-based asymmetrical relations 
and in particular asked whether infants possess expectations about how leaders will act towards 
subordinates. I presented infants with live events involving interactions between three puppets of 
the same kind (or from the same social group). Infants watched either a leader (authority 
condition) or a target-subordinate (no-authority condition) interact with two other subordinates 
(all three subordinates were of equal status). In Experiments 1 and 2, the leader or target-
subordinate made two toys available to the two subordinates, but one selfishly took them both. I 
found that 16- to 18-month-old infants expected the leader to rectify, as opposed to ignore, this 
transgression (i.e., taking more than one’s share). Infants held no particular expectations about 
the target-subordinate’s response in the same situation. This result held regardless of how 
leadership was marked (Experiment 1: physical size; Experiment 2: control over others’ actions). 
In Experiment 3, a single toy was requested by two subordinates, though one had had several 
turns at playing with it prior to the other subordinate’s arrival. I found that 20- to 24-month-old 
infants expected the leader to regulate the use of this limited resource fairly, by handing the toy 
to the subordinate with no previous turns at playing with it. Infants held no expectations about 
the target-subordinate’s actions in the same situation. This pattern, however, was found only in 
infants who attended daycare and presumably had more experience with authority figures 
regulating turn-taking. Together, these experiments suggest that infants within the second year of 
life (1) are sensitive to authority-based asymmetrical social relations and (2) already have 
differential expectations about how a leader versus an equal-status group member will act in 
situations that could violate group harmony. These findings also indicate that relevant social 
experiences may be needed to support the emergence of some of these expectations.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
As adults, we possess a rich and nuanced capacity to interpret and evaluate interactions 
among individuals. This capacity helps us navigate through a complex social world filled with a 
myriad of diverse relationships, short-term interactions, and practices to which we attach 
meaning and value. There is general agreement among social scientists that our expectations and 
evaluations concerning human conduct are guided by some internal standards of what we deem 
obligatory, permissible, or prohibited. At the same time, however, there has been a great deal of 
disagreement among scholars as to what aspects of social life fall within the purview of morality. 
The studies in my dissertation explore human morality from a developmental perspective and 
examine whether (at least some aspects of some) hierarchical relations might be considered 
within the scope of morality.  
Broadly speaking, scholars interested in the study of morality and its development can be 
divided into two groups, those who view morality as having a narrow scope (narrow view) and 
those who view morality has having a broader, more encompassing scope (broad view). I begin 
with an overview of these two views and then suggest how developmental evidence might bear 
on this debate. 
Narrow view 
Proponents of the narrow view of morality define it as dealing exclusively with concerns 
about fairness/equity/justice (henceforth fairness) and no-harm/welfare/care (henceforth no-
harm). In this view, aspects of our social life that cannot be conceptualized in these terms do not 
belong to the moral domain and are reasoned about very differently. Such “non-moral” issues are 
viewed as less serious, more context-dependent, arbitrary, and changeable. In short, only aspects
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of our social life that pertain to an individual’s rights and autonomy fall within the scope of 
morality.  
Researchers who endorse the narrow view have differed in their ideas about how and 
when over the course of development we acquire this moral content. Building on ideas put forth 
by Piaget (1932), Kohlberg (1969, 1981) proposed a stage theory in which individuals evaluate 
actions first in relation to the self (i.e., act X is “right” because I will be rewarded and avoid 
punishment), and then in relation to group conventions (i.e., act X is “right” because it is what 
the group agreed upon). Finally, during adulthood, judgments become impartial and reflect pure 
morality (i.e., act X is “right”, irrespective of self or group considerations). More contemporary 
theorists, such as Turiel, Nucci, Smetana, and others (e.g., Laupa & Turiel, 1993; Nucci & 
Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981, 1984) questioned the idea that conventional and moral forms of 
reasoning succeed each other in the course of development. Instead, they argued that both forms 
of reasoning already coexist at least by 3 years of age and develop independently (a third 
domain, the personal domain, also emerges at about the same time; it is concerned with matters 
of privacy and personal preferences and is thought to be critical to the establishment of the 
child’s individual identity; e.g., Killen & Smetana, 1999; Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Gingo, 2011). 
 Despite these differences, developmental researchers who endorse the narrow view 
generally agree that children construct their moral knowledge as a result of their interactions 
with peers, because such interactions afford role taking. That is, you learn to treat others fairly 
and refrain from harming them because you experience what it feels like when someone is unfair 
to you or violates your well-being (physically or mentally). Normative moral development, in 
this view, means that children across all cultures construct and apply the same principles of 
fairness and no-harm in their dealings with others. Differences in moral reasoning, when they 
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occur, simply reflect a deficiency in peer interactions (for reviews see e.g., Killen & Smetana, 
2015; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981). 
Broad view 
Over the past decade or so, research in anthropology and social psychology has revealed 
that (a) cultures vary widely in moral judgments, contrary to what proponents of the narrow view 
postulated, and (b) despite this variability, many cultures share moral concerns that go beyond 
fairness and no-harm. Much of this work had been based on interviews meant to assess how 
children and adults across different cultures reason about social dilemmas (choosing between 
two courses of action) and various behaviors in isolation. Below I summarize some of the main 
findings. 
Cultures differ in their moral judgments. In their seminal work, Shweder, Mahapatra, 
and Miller (1987) probed American and Hindu participants’ judgments of 39 different behaviors 
and social practices. In nearly 50% of cases, participants from the two cultures disagreed: 
behaviors that participants in India deemed “wrong” (e.g., addressing one’s father by his first 
name, eating beef, a widow eating fish, a wife requesting a massage), American participants 
viewed as “right”, and behaviors that Americans deemed “wrong” (e.g., beating a wife for 
having gone to see a movie alone, unequal inheritance favoring males), Indians viewed as 
“right”. These differences were already evident in children as young as 5 years of age, and within 
each culture, children’s and adults’ judgments were highly similar. Additionally, cases that 
Americans treated similarly (e.g., beating a disobedient wife, beating a dog), Indians judged to 
be radically different (the former is permissible, but the latter is not); conversely, cases that 
Indians viewed as similar (e.g., addressing one’s father by his first name, a wife requesting a 
massage), Americans judged to be very different. Finally, the two cultures also varied in whom 
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they included within the moral circle (i.e., what agents are entitled to fair treatment and 
protection from harm). In the Hindu culture, all living entities are part of the moral circle, and 
hence eating animals is considered morally wrong.  
Other research findings suggested that cultures differ in what they view as the scope of 
‘harm’. For example, Japanese fifth graders, but not their American counterparts, viewed 
chewing gum in the classroom as harmful to the “teacher’s mind,” because they construed harm 
broadly (Naito, Ibusuki, Lin & Rhee, 1991). 
Yet other findings suggested that cultures rank fairness and in-group support 
(interpersonal obligations) differently, when the two are in conflict. Miller and her colleagues 
asked Indians and Americans to resolve hypothetical conflicts, such as the following: Should 
individual A steal a train ticket from individual B’s coat (knowing B has enough money to buy a 
new train ticket) in order to reach his friend’s wedding in time to deliver the wedding rings? 
Although both the Indians and Americans generally viewed stealing as an immoral action, most 
Indians favored interpersonal obligations (i.e., said A should steal), whereas most Americans 
favored fairness (i.e., said A should not steal) and viewed the action of helping the friend in 
voluntary terms (e.g., Miller, 1994; Miller & Bersoff, 1992).  
Cultures share many concerns that go beyond fairness and no-harm. During the 
1990’s, a number of scholars set out to identify what beliefs and concerns underlie moral 
judgments in different cultures and whether there are any commonalties in these beliefs. Shweder 
and his colleagues identified three sets of beliefs, or ethics, in the moral discourse of Hindu 
culture (also known as “The Big Three”). The first set of beliefs concerned the autonomy of the 
individual and dictated fairness and no-harm. The second set concerned the community and 
dictated respect for social order and roles within the community. The third set of beliefs was 
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about purity and sanctity (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997).  
Informed by ethnographic observations across five cultures, Alan Fiske (1992) proposed 
that individuals use four elementary social relational schemas to organize all aspects of their 
social lives (e.g., reciprocal exchange, division of labor, decision making, conflicts, moral 
judgment, and so on), and that moral judgment in any particular situation depends on which 
relational schema(s) individuals employ. In Communal Sharing, we perceive others to be 
undifferentiated and equal to us. In Authority Ranking, we perceive others with respect to their 
position in the group hierarchy. In Equality Matching, we track imbalances between ourselves 
and others on a tit-for-tat basis. In Market Pricing, we measure ourselves compared to others on a 
cost-benefit basis. Cultures vary in the particular relational schemas they emphasize as well as in 
how they implement them. For example, in a Communal Sharing schema, the Moose of Burkina 
Faso tend to share child-care, possessions, and land, but not thoughts, intentions, motivations, 
and feelings. Americans display the opposite pattern of what they share (Fiske, 1992; Rai & 
Fiske, 2011).  
Finally, Haidt and his colleagues (e.g., Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 
1993) found that when American participants are asked to define morality in an open-ended 
fashion, they make reference not only to concerns about fairness and no-harm, but also duty, 
obedience, respect, god, the soul, and purity of the mind. These results led Haidt and his 
colleagues to devise a questionnaire that they then administered across multiple nations. On the 
basis of their results, they identified at least five “moral foundations” that appeared across 
nations, to varying degrees (Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011).  
Inspired by the cross-cultural evidence reviewed above, scholars proposed a new, broader 
view of morality which suggested that (a) we must include principles that go beyond fairness and 
  6 
no-harm in the basic structure of moral cognition and (b) the end-state of moral knowledge can 
vary across individuals, not because of insufficient peer interactions, but because of the 
particular cultures the individuals live in. Although there is considerable disagreement about the 
nature and number of socio-moral principles, common candidates include the principles of 
fairness, no-harm, in-group, authority, and purity. All other things being equal, we expect 
individuals to receive what they deserve when resources, rewards, and punishments are allocated 
(fairness). In addition, we expect individuals to generally refrain from causing harm to others (by 
commission or omission) and to help those who have been harmed (no-harm). We show support 
and loyalty to members of our social groups and generally act in ways that help maintain group 
cohesiveness and cooperation (in-group). We respect, obey, and defer to superiors, and they in 
turn fulfill obligations towards us (authority). Finally, acts that taint the soul and body are to be 
avoided (purity) (Fiske, 1992; Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Graham, 2006; Haidt & Joseph, 
2007; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park 1997).   
An initial draft of morality. Having achieved a tentative list of candidate socio-moral 
principles, researchers were naturally led to ask what would make it possible to have such 
recurring principles across cultures. It seemed unlikely that different cultures would 
independently arrive at the same principles without any guiding constraints. Evolutionary 
psychology suggested a possible source for these constraints. 
An important focus within evolutionary psychology has been what function morality 
served for our distant human ancestors (e.g., Boehm, 1982; Krebs, 2005, 2008). Researchers with 
this functionalist approach have proposed that our ancestors survived by forming small groups of 
hunter-gatherers and cooperating to solve problems (e.g., finding food, shelter, etc.). Over the 
course of evolution, a number of adaptations gradually emerged to help maintain group 
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cohesiveness and to support cooperation within groups and (to a lesser extent) between groups. 
For example, one adaptation hypothesized to have evolved is the ability to detect cheaters who 
intentionally do not contribute to collaborative efforts. Another hypothesized adaptation is the 
tendency to defer to those who are more powerful, as a means of avoiding costly fighting and 
fostering beneficial relationships with those who can protect us in the long run. As a result of 
these and other adaptations, humans became biologically better prepared to navigate their social 
environments and to detect those who could threaten collaborative efforts (e.g., Baumard, André, 
& Sperber, 2013; Boehm, 1982; Delton, Cosmides, Guemo, Robertson, & Tooby, 2012; Krebs, 
2008; Cosmides, Barrett, & Tooby, 2010).  
Inspired by these ideas from evolutionary psychology, proponents of the broad view of 
morality have proposed that we are innately equipped with an “initial draft” of our moral 
knowledge (e.g., Graham et al., 2011), and that this “draft” undergoes extensive revision as a 
function of the culture we live in (i.e., what principles our culture emphasizes, how it orders or 
prioritizes the principles, and so on; e.g., Rai & Fiske, 2011; Miller & Bersoff, 1992). If this 
proposal of an “initial draft” is correct, then the earliest signs of morality may already be evident 
in infancy. By uncovering these signs, developmental researchers can not only provide new 
evidence for this initial draft, but also test specific hypotheses derived from the broad view of 
morality about the contents of this draft. 
Prior infant findings on fairness and no-harm 
In recent years, developmental psychologists have begun examining whether infants are 
indeed sensitive to moral principles. Obviously, unlike children and adults, infants lack the 
linguistic capabilities to be interviewed about the beliefs that underlie their moral judgments of 
“right” and “wrong”. In this sense, it is difficult to say with strong conviction that infants already 
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possess beliefs about obligatory versus permissible social behaviors (i.e., the difference between 
“ought” and “is”). However, researchers can nevertheless identify abstract predispositions 
towards moral concerns; by measuring how infants spontaneously interpret and evaluate 
interactions between individuals, we can learn about the “initial draft” of morality and identify 
the precursors that are gradually refined over development.  
To date, elegant experiments using primarily third-party tasks (i.e., tasks where infants 
observe, but do not participate in social interactions) have revealed that infants are sensitive to 
the moral principle of fairness. By the second year of life, infants give evidence that they expect 
individuals to act fairly: they look longer at scenarios in which an agent distributes resources 
unequally as opposed to equally between two recipients (e.g., Geraci & Surian, 2011; Meristo & 
Surian, 2013; Meristo, Strid & Surian, 2015; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2001; Sloane, 
Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012), and they also look longer when an agent dispenses rewards 
equally between a recipient who deserves a reward (i.e., worked to complete an assigned chore) 
and a recipient who does not (i.e., did no work to complete the assigned chore; Sloane et al., 
2012). Moreover, when exposed to two individuals, one who distributed resources fairly and one 
who distributed resources unfairly, infants prefer the fair distributor themselves in a manual-
choice task (e.g., Geraci & Surian, 2011), and they also expect a bystander who observed the 
distributors’ actions to do the same: they look longer if the bystander approaches and rewards the 
unfair as opposed to the fair distributor (e.g., Meristo & Surian, 2013).  
Infants in the second year of life also show sensitivity to the principle of no-harm. For 
example, when tested in first-party tasks in which they interact with others, infants attempt to 
verbally or physically comfort individuals who show signs of distress (e.g., appear to be sad or in 
pain; Roth-Hanania, Davidov, & Zahn-Waxler, 2011). In addition (focusing on concern for 
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others’ welfare more broadly), infants have been found to spontaneously inform an individual 
that his/her desired object has been displaced, or to help an individual by bringing closer an 
object out of reach (e.g., Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello, 2006; Warneken & 
Tomassello 2006, 2007). Relatedly, evidence from third-party tasks indicates that infants in the 
first year of life show a preference for helpers over hinderers and also expect others to share this 
preference. Thus, after viewing a scenario in which a protagonist tried to climb a hill and was 
either helped by one character or hindered by another (i.e., being pushed uphill or being pushed 
downhill, respectively), infants were more likely to choose the helper than the hinderer in a 
manual-choice task, and (beginning at about 10 months of age) they also looked longer when the 
protagonist approached the hinderer as opposed to the helper (e.g., Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 
2007). In other events, a protagonist tried vainly to open a box so as to retrieve a toy; a helper 
helped the protagonist open the box, and a hinderer jumped on the box and slammed it shut. 
Next, the helper or hinderer were either helped or hindered by new characters. When asked to 
choose between these new characters, infants preferred the one who helped (as opposed to 
hindered) the original helper and the one who hindered (as opposed to helped) the original 
hinderer, thus showing context-specific socio-moral evaluation (e.g., Hamlin, 2014; Hamlin, 
Wynn, Bloom, & Mahajan, 2011).  
The present research: Authority 
The evidence reviewed in the preceding section suggests that some degree of sensitivity 
to fairness and no-harm (or welfare more generally) is already present in infants. Little attention, 
however, has been devoted to other candidate socio-moral principles. My dissertation focuses on 
one such principle, authority (i.e., leaders and subordinates have obligations toward each other). 
In particular, I explore how infants represent authority-based leadership and whether they expect 
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leaders to have obligations (i.e., duties or responsibilities) toward their subordinates. This is an 
important research endeavor, for two reasons. First, there has been no experimental exploration 
to date of infants’ expectations about authority, so this research breaks new empirical ground. 
Second, finding that infants have additional moral sensitivities beyond fairness and no-harm 
would provide new evidence for the broad view of morality and its suggestion that the “initial 
draft” of moral cognition may also include expectations about authority.  
At this point, it is important to clarify what I mean by authority. The adult literature 
across disciplines uses different terms and definitions (e.g., power, authority, rank, dominance, 
leadership, status, social position) to characterize asymmetrical social relations. Among others, 
definitions vary on the basis of: (a) what is controlled, resources or individuals’ behavior (e.g., 
Blader & Chen, 2012; Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone & Henrich, 2013; Emerson, 1962; 
French & Raven, 1959; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), (b) whether there is group acceptance of the 
dominant position (e.g., Grimes, 1978; Tyler & Lind, 1992), (c) what types of goals are pursued, 
self- or group-focused goals (e.g., Abrams, de Moura & Travaglino, 2013; Grimes, 1978; Maner 
& Mead, 2010), (d) how the dominant position is attained and maintained (e.g., Cheng et al., 
2013; Hogg, 2001; Van Vugt, 2006), and (e) what functions the different positions serve in the 
asymmetrical relationship (e.g., Graham et al., 2013; Fiske, 1992; Rai & Fiske, 2011).    
Despite this terminological confusion, we can identify two main kinds of asymmetrical 
relations: coercive power vs. legitimate power (or authority). Coercive power (a) involves the 
exercise of force or coercion, either physical or mental and either actual or implied, (b) does not 
depend on a group’s or individual’s acceptance, and (c) typically revolves around the pursuit of 
self-focused goals. As such, coercive power manifests itself primarily in competitive situations 
where both sides are attempting to attain the same goal and one side prevails over the other. This 
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is often referred to as dominance, and most scholars tend to focus on the dominant rather than on 
the subordinate in this relationship (e.g., Cheng et. al., 2013; French & Raven, 1959; Van Vugt, 
2006). 
In contrast, legitimate power or authority (a) is typically not exercised by force or 
coercion, (b) relies on the group’s acceptance, and (c) typically revolves around the pursuit of 
group-focused goals. As such, legitimate power manifests itself in a variety of situations and is 
more reliably detectable in group-like settings because an authority’s legitimacy depends heavily 
on the group’s acceptance. Factors that affect whether an authority figure is viewed as legitimate 
are the degree to which he/ she applies fair procedures (e.g., Tyler & Lind, 1992), represents and 
acts in accord with the group’s values (e.g., Hogg, 2001), does not promote selfish goals over 
group goals (Maner & Mead, 2010), and fulfills his or her obligations (e.g., protection, 
assistance) towards subordinates (e.g., Fiske, 1992; French & Raven, 1959; Graham et al., 2013; 
Rai & Fiske, 2011).   
Prior developmental findings on asymmetrical social relations 
The research to date on how young children and infants understand asymmetrical social 
relations has largely focused on the problem of identification. That is, how do young children 
and infants sort individuals into “leaders” and “subordinates”, and how stable is this sorting 
across contexts? As is often the case, methods and measures have differed somewhat in 
investigations with young children and with infants; below, I summarize findings with each age 
group in turn. Importantly, within each age group, one can broadly make a distinction between 
cues that are competition-dependent (i.e., whichever protagonist prevails in a competition is 
identified as the “leader”) and those that are competition-independent (i.e., physical and 
behavioral features are used to identify the “leader” in non-competitive interactions). 
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Children’s identification of leadership. Studies with young children (between 3 and 9 
years of age) typically involve scenarios in which two protagonists are engaged in a competitive 
or non-competitive interaction. Children are explicitly asked, “Who is the boss/in charge?” 
(Occasionally, a detailed definition is provided to ensure the child understands the question, such 
as “the person who makes all the rules and tells others what to do”). When the protagonists are 
engaged in a competitive interaction (e.g., deciding which of two different games to play, 
engaging in a fight), 3- to 9-year-olds usually identify the protagonist who prevailed in the 
competition as the leader (e.g., Charafeddine et al., 2015, 2016; Gülgöz & Gelman, 2016). This 
identification leads 3- to 5-year-old children (a) to allocate more resources to a leader than a 
subordinate (Charafeddine et al., 2016) and (b) to trust a leader’s testimony more than a 
subordinate’s (Bernard et al., 2016).  
 When the protagonists are not engaged in a competitive interaction, results are somewhat 
mixed but generally suggest that children can take into account a variety of physical and 
behavioral cues, with more and more cues being attended to with age. For example, Brey and 
Shutts (2015) found that 5- and 6-year-olds could use holding an expansive posture, tilting the 
head back, and looking at others with a direct gaze as cues to leadership; in contrast, 3- and 4-
year-olds did not respond to any of these cues unless the protagonist also gave instructions on 
how to solve a problem. Over and Carpenter (2015) found that 5- but not 4-year-olds could use 
being imitated by others as a cue to leadership. Charafeddine et al. (2015) found that 3- to 5-
years-olds could use expansive posture, head tilt, age, and wealth as cues to leadership. Finally, 
Gülgöz and Gelman (2016) found that 3- and 4-year-olds could use wealth, goal achievement 
(broadly defined), and permission granting/denying as cues for leadership; 5- and 6-year-olds 
could also use setting norms; and 7- to 9-year-olds could also use giving orders. 
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Infants’ identification of leadership. In studies with infants, two protagonists compete 
over a common goal—a right of way, resource, or territory—and infants’ expectation (as 
measured by looking time) about who will prevail is taken as an implicit index of leadership. The 
majority of these studies typically involve computer-animated events in which the protagonists 
are geometrical figures with rudimentary facial features (eyes and mouths). 
In one report (Thomsen, Frankenhuis, Ingold-Smith, & Carey, 2011), for example, 8- to- 
16-month-old infants watched events in which the protagonists were a large green block and a 
small blue block. Infants were familiarized separately to each protagonist traveling on a path in a 
particular direction (e.g., the small block traveled left to right on one trial, and the large block 
traveled right to left on the other trial). Next, a conflict scene was introduced: both agents 
followed their usual paths (i.e., towards one another) and bumped into each other. On some 
trials, infants saw the small block bow and yield the way to the large block; on other trials, they 
saw the large block bow and yield the way to the small block. Infants 10 months and older 
detected a violation when the large block bowed and yielded the way, suggesting that they 
viewed physical size as predictive of power.  
In another report (Mascaro & Csibra, 2012), 9- to- 15- month-old infants watched dyadic 
interactions between geometrical figures that varied in color and shape (e.g., a blue circle and a 
red triangle). In familiarization trials, agent A (e.g., the blue circle) was seen achieving its goal 
(e.g., collecting objects) and then agent B (e.g., the red triangle) entered the scene. Both 
approached a desired object, but B succeeded in collecting it, while A withdrew. Infants were 
next presented with two test events in which agents A and B competed again over collecting 
objects. In the coherent event, B again prevailed; in the incoherent event, A now prevailed. 
Results indicated that infants age 12 months and older expected agent B, who had prevailed in 
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the first competition, to also prevail in the second competition, as long as it was the same kind of 
competition as the first (i.e., collecting a new object). When the context of the second 
competition was different (e.g., occupying a limited territory), only 15-month-old infants 
expected the agent who had prevailed in the first competition to also prevail in the new one. 
There are thus important developments during the second year of life in infants’ representation of 
power relations, from being bound by context to being stable across contexts. 
Interestingly, Mascaro and Csibra (2012) also found that infants did not view power in an 
agent as a stable trait that held regardless of the identity of the other protagonist in the scene. 
When a new agent C (e.g., a black pentagon) was introduced in the test trials, infants had no 
expectations about who would prevail—agent B, who had previously prevailed over A, or the 
new agent C. This suggests that infants view power as a relational property, defined by the 
interaction between particular agents. A follow-up study (Mascaro & Csibra, 2014) revealed that 
if given information about three agents involved in dyadic interactions (e.g., A > B and B > C, 
where ‘ > ’ denotes who prevails over whom), 15-month-old infants could form a social 
hierarchy amongst them (A > B > C) as long as the conflict context remained the same (e.g., the 
agents always competed over territory or always competed over objects), but not across different 
contexts of conflict. This finding had also been extended to infants who are 10- to-13 months old 
viewing dyadic competitions between three different kinds of puppets (e.g., bear, hippo, and 
elephant; Gazes, Hampton, & Lourenco, 2015).  
A recent report (Pun, Baron, & Birch, 2016) examined whether 6- to 12-month-old 
infants could use the relative sizes of two protagonists’ groups to predict which protagonist was 
more likely to prevail in a competitive situation. Infants watched dyadic interactions between 
geometrical figures that varied in color (e.g., a green square and a blue square) and in the size of 
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their groups (e.g., a larger group with three members versus a smaller group with two members). 
The study was modeled after the Thomsen et al. (2011) study in which geometrical figures 
competed for a right of way, with one exception: the competing figures here were of the same 
size, but one belonged to a larger group whereas the other belonged to a smaller group. 
Appropriate controls were in place to ensure that infants were not responding to the total 
magnitude or surface area of the group (i.e., the authors adjusted the sizes of the three characters 
in the larger group so that their total surface area was equal to that of the two characters in the 
smaller group). Infants looked reliably longer when an agent from the larger group bowed and 
yielded the way compared to when the agent from the smaller group bowed and yielded the way, 
suggesting that infants are capable of using the relative size of a group to which a protagonist 
belongs as a cue to social power.  
Overview of the present experiments 
The studies reviewed in the last section suggest that infants detect power-based 
asymmetrical interactions. To do this, they use physical cues such as the relative sizes of agents 
and their respective groups as well as behavioral cues such as who prevails over whom in a 
competitive situation. What we do not know yet is whether infants also (a) detect authority-based 
social asymmetries and (b) have expectations about how leaders will act towards subordinates. 
My dissertation is an initial exploration of these questions. 
 Across all experiments, I used the well-established violation-of-expectation (VOE) 
paradigm; the rationale of this paradigm is that infants typically look longer at events that are 
inconsistent, as opposed to, consistent with their expectations. I presented infants with live 
events involving interactions between three puppets of the same kind (or from the same social 
group); these were bears in Experiments 1 and 2 and pigs in Experiment 3. In each experiment, 
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infants watched either a leader (authority condition) or a target subordinate (no-authority 
condition) interact with two other subordinates (all three subordinates were of equal status). This 
feature of our studies enabled us to explore whether infants had differential expectations about 
how a leader versus a subordinate member of a group might act in situations that could violate 
group harmony. Specifically, would infants expect the leader to intervene in an attempt to uphold 
or restore group harmony, but hold no particular expectation about whether the target 
subordinate would intervene? In chapter 2, I report on studies with infants ages 16-18 months 
that explored their expectations about rectifying transgressions committed within the group. In 
chapter 3, I report a study with infants ages 20-24 months that explored their expectations about 
regulating access to a limited resource within the group.  
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CHAPTER 2: LEADERS RECTIFY TRANSGRESSIONS WITHIN THE GROUP 
 In this chapter, I focus on a situation of conflict between members of a group, which 
could impact the group’s cohesiveness, cooperativeness, and harmony. As Brewer (1999) wrote, 
“group living represents the fundamental survival strategy that characterizes the human species” 
(p. 433). Given that humans have survived over evolution by living in groups and forming 
coalitions, it would not be surprising if attempts to resolve conflicts were expected (as we shall 
see in chapter 3, attempts to prevent conflicts from happening in the first place would also be 
expected). Interesting questions can be asked with respect to these attempts to resolve conflicts. 
Is any group member expected to resolve conflicts? What if a group member was only 
witnessing the conflict and was not directly involved in it?  
 From the perspective of the narrow view of morality, the no-harm principle should be 
applied irrespective of how people are grouped or what roles they may have within the group. 
Thus, upon witnessing a conflict involving harm to someone, any individual would be expected 
to provide help to the victim and resolve the conflict. It is considered wrong not to do so. In 
practice, however, research on phenomena such as the bystander effect suggests that individuals 
will not always provide assistance to a victim (e.g., Darley & Latané, 1968; Levine & Crowther, 
2008; Rutkowski, Gruder & Romer, 1983). According to the broad view of morality, contextual 
factors will affect whether and how an individual is likely to respond to a conflict he/she 
witnesses. One such factor could be the individual’s relation to the victim and the transgressor 
(e.g., whether they belong to the same social group or not). Another factor could be the 
individual’s position within the hierarchy of the group.   
At least three pieces of evidence suggest that having a recognized leadership role does 
lead individuals to provide assistance to someone in need, and that failing to do so is perceived to 
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be just as morally wrong as causing harm directly. In one study (Baumeister, Chesner, Senders, 
& Tice, 1988), for example, participants who were assigned to the role of group leader in the 
context of a particular task were more likely to help in an unrelated context (an individual they 
heard “choking” and asking for help) than were participants assigned to a subordinate role, even 
though helping in this unrelated context was not part of the leader’s formal responsibilities. 
Although this situation did not involve conflict within the group (the focus of this chapter), it is 
evidence that when individuals take on a role of leadership in a particular context, they 
generalize their sense of responsibility and “feel less able to diffuse responsibilities in the 
emergency than would other group members” (p.18). In two other studies, participants were 
presented with hypothetical vignettes in which a target character had either a superior position or 
an equal position relative to other characters. In some of these studies, harm occurred as a result 
of the target character not preventing it (i.e., an act of omission). Participants tended to evaluate 
the superior character more harshly, almost as though he/she had caused the harm directly (Haidt 
& Baron, 1996). Participants also held the superior character responsible for a harmful action by 
a subordinate, especially if the superior character could have prevented the harm (Shultz, Jaggi & 
Schleifer, 1987). Together, these findings suggest that adults have differential expectations about 
the responsibilities of a leader and those of subordinates or equal-status members within a group. 
Specifically, leaders seem to have a large scope of responsibility that spans over different 
contexts and makes them accountable for actions they did not commit but could have prevented.  
Might infants also hold different expectations about how a leader and a subordinate or 
equal-status member would respond to a conflict within the group? I explored this question in 
two experiments with 16- to- 18- month-old infants. Building on prior work, which suggested 
that an individual’s large size (and postures that enhance it) serve as a cue for asymmetrical 
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social relations in infants, children, and adults (e.g., Brey & Shutts, 2015; Hall, Coats & Smith 
LeBeau, 2005; Thomsen et al., 2011), in Experiment 1 I marked the leader by a larger size than 
the subordinates. In Experiment 2, I marked leadership by the ability to control subordinates’ 
actions (i.e., giving orders or instructions that are obeyed). As far as I know, the latter cue has 
not yet been manipulated in research on infants’ expectations about asymmetrical social 
relationships and is thus a novel feature of these studies. 
 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, 16- to- 18-month-old infants watched a live event in which one group 
member committed a transgression towards another group member. A third member of the group 
(termed the observer), who was either a leader or an equal-status member, witnessed this 
transgression; Experiment 1 asked whether infants held expectations about the responses of this 
observer. Specifically, would infants (a) expect either observer to rectify the transgression and 
hence (b) detect a violation when either observer ignored the transgression instead? Or would 
infants view the act of rectifying a transgression as an obligation of the leader, but not of the 
equal-status observer? 
 
Design 
Infants were randomly assigned to an authority or a no-authority condition. Within each 
condition, infants received one test trial in which they saw either a rectify or an ignore event.  
Authority condition. Infants watched interactions involving three puppets: a large bear 
and two small bears of identical height (Fig. 1). Infants received a single test trial, which had an 
initial phase and a final phase. At the start of the initial phase (40-s) (Fig. 2), the two small bears 
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protruded from windows on either side of the apparatus, and they swayed in unison (as though 
dancing) in front of their placemats. Next, the large bear entered the scene through a window 
centered in the back wall of the apparatus. The large bear held a tray with two identical toy cubes 
and announced, “Toys!”. After the small bears answered excitedly “Yay, yay!”, the large bear 
said, “Go ahead” and stepped back to allow the small bears easy access to the toys. Both bears 
then approached the tray, but one bear (i.e., the wrongdoer) quickly grabbed both toys and placed 
them on its placemat. At this point, the other small bear (i.e., the victim) returned to its placemat 
empty-handed. In the rectify event, the large bear approached the wrongdoer’s placemat, grasped 
one of the two toys on it, and placed it on the victim’s placemat. Finally, the large bear took the 
tray, left the scene, and the small bears looked down at their placemats (each bear had one toy) 
and paused. In the ignore event, the large bear approached the wrongdoer’s placemat (with the 
two toys on it) and then the victim’s placemat (with no toy on it), but did not re-distribute one of 
the toys. Finally, the large bear took the tray, left the scene, and the small bears looked down at 
their placemats and paused. During the final phase of the test trial, no further actions took place; 
infants simply watched the paused scene with the two small bears, placemats, and toys. 
 We reasoned that if infants (a) perceived the three bears as members of the same social 
group (infants this age typically categorize animals into distinct basic-level categories, and the 
three bears were very similar overall and interacted in a coordinated manner; e.g., Pauen, 2002; 
Xu & Carey, 1996), (b) perceived the large bear as the leader of the group and the small bears as 
subordinate members of the group, given their relative physical sizes, and (c) expected the large 
bear, as the leader, to rectify the transgression committed by the wrongdoer, then they should 
detect a violation when the large bear took no action to correct the transgression. Infants who 
saw the ignore event should thus look reliably longer than those who saw the rectify event. 
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No-Authority condition. Infants watched the same events, except that they involved 
three small bear puppets (Fig. 1). We predicted that infants would construe all bears as being of 
equal status. If infants had no particular expectations about how an equal-status member of a 
group should respond to a transgression by and against equal-status members within the group, 
then they should look about equally at the rectify and ignore events.  
 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 34 healthy term infants, 14 male (M = 17 months, 16 days, range = 16 
months, 3 day to 18 months, 28 days). Another 6 infants were tested but excluded because they 
cried (1), were distracted (1), or reached the maximum looking time allowed (4). Infants were 
assigned randomly to the authority (n = 16) and no-authority (n = 18) conditions. Within each 
condition, about half the infants saw the rectify event and half saw the ignore event.  
 
Apparatus and stimuli 
The apparatus consisted of a brightly lit display booth (106 cm high X 101 cm wide X 57 
cm deep) mounted 76 cm above the floor of the test room. The infant faced a large opening (41 
cm X 95 cm) in the front of the apparatus; between trials, a curtain (61 cm X 100 cm) was 
lowered by a supervisor to hide this opening. Inside the apparatus, the sidewalls were painted 
white, and the back wall and floor were covered with pastel adhesive paper. 
Three experimenters worked together to produce the events. Each experimenter wore a 
cream shirt and operated a bear puppet. Each bear had an outfit composed of a hat and a 
matching-colored shirt (red, blue, or yellow). The bear with the red outfit was always brought in 
and out through a central opening in the back wall (28 cm high X 51 cm wide); this opening was 
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covered with semi-transparent fabric, to allow the experimenter to see well enough into the 
apparatus to produce the scripted actions. In the authority condition, the red bear was large (44.5 
cm X 17.75 cm X 11.5 cm); in the no-authority condition, the red bear was small (29.25 cm X 
17.75 cm X 11.5 cm) and matched the other small bears (yellow and blue) in size. The yellow 
and blue bears were positioned on either side of the apparatus, visible via a fringed window. The 
positions of these bears (yellow on left and blue on right or vice versa) and the identity of the 
wrongdoer (yellow or blue) were counterbalanced across infants. In front of each ‘side’ bear 
(yellow and blue) was a cream-colored placemat (0.75 cm X 12.75 cm X 22.75 cm). The wooden 
tray (1.25 cm X 22.75 cm X 22.75 cm) that the red bear brought into the scene was placed at the 
center of the apparatus floor, 38.75 cm from each side bear. On this tray were two toy cubes 
(3.25 cm X 3.25 cm X 3.25 cm), placed 2.5 cm apart. To ensure that no auditory cues signaled to 
the observers whether the infant was watching the rectify or the ignore event, the placemats were 
covered with felt, and the toy cubes also had felt on the bottom. 
During each session, one camera captured an image of the events, and another camera 
captured an image of the infant. The two images were combined, projected onto a computer 
monitor located behind the apparatus, and watched by the supervisor to confirm that the events 
followed the prescribed scripts. Recorded sessions were also checked off-line for accuracy.  
 
Procedure 
 Infants sat on a parent’s lap, centered in front of the apparatus; parents were instructed to 
remain silent and close their eyes. During the trial, two naïve observers hidden on either side of 
the apparatus monitored the infant’s looking behavior. From their viewpoints, the observers 
could not determine to which condition the infant was assigned and which test event was 
presented. Inter-observer agreement during the test trial was measured as the proportion of 100-
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ms intervals in which the observers agreed on whether or not the infant was looking at the event. 
Agreement averaged 95% per infant. 
Looking times during the initial and final phases of the test trial were computed 
separately. Infants were highly attentive during the initial phase of the test trial; across 
conditions, they looked, on average, for 39.6/40 s. The final phase of the test trial ended when 
infants (a) looked away for 1 consecutive second after having looked for at least 6 cumulative 
seconds or (b) looked for 45 cumulative seconds.  
Preliminary analysis of the test data revealed no interaction of condition and event with 
infants’ sex. The data were therefore collapsed across sex.  
 
Results 
 Infants’ looking times during the final phase of the test trial (Fig. 3) were subjected to an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with condition (authority or no-authority) and event (rectify or 
ignore) as between-subjects factors. The main effects of condition, F (1, 30) <1, and event, F 
(1,30) = 1.82, p = 0.187, did not reach significance. The Condition X Event interaction was 
significant, F (1, 30) = 6.75, p = 0.014. Planned comparisons were conducted within each 
condition. In the authority condition, infants who saw the ignore event (M = 24.2, SD =10.6) 
looked reliably longer than those who saw the rectify event (M =13.4, SD =7.8), F (1, 30) = 7.30, 
p = 0.011. In the no-authority condition, in contrast, infants looked about equally at the two 
events (ignore: M =16.3, SD = 8.4, rectify: M =19.7, SD =4.3), F (1, 30) < 1. 
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 suggested that 16- to 18-month-old infants hold different 
expectations about an observer’s appropriate response to a transgression committed within a 
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group, depending on the observer’s status. Specifically, infants expected a leader (a larger-sized 
puppet) to rectify, as opposed to ignore, a transgression committed by a subordinate toward 
another subordinate. In contrast, infants had no particular expectations about how an observer of 
equal standing (a puppet of the same size as the wrongdoer and victim) should act in the face of 
this transgression.  
An alternative interpretation of these results, however, was that infants simply associated 
the larger-sized leader with greater physical capacity or agency, as adults sometimes do (e.g., 
Guinote, in press; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). Thus, infants viewed the (more 
agentive) rectifying actions as more expected than the (less agentive) ignoring actions for the 
larger-sized leader. In contrast, infants held no such expectation for the smaller-sized, equal-
status observer, as they were unclear about this observer’s physical capacity or agency in the 
absence of a clear physical size cue. One way to test this alternative interpretation was to mark 
leadership by a different cue and examine whether results still held when all puppets were of 
equal size.  Experiment 2 was designed to do this.  
 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 had two goals. One was to confirm that 16- to 18-month-olds hold 
differential expectations for leaders vs. equal-status members who witness a transgression 
committed by one group member towards another group member. Another goal was to examine 
whether the same results would be obtained when leadership was marked by a different cue, 
control of one individual over others’ actions, as indexed by their compliance with the 
individual’s verbal instructions.  
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Design 
Infants were assigned to either an authority or a no-authority condition. The procedure 
was identical to that of Experiment 1 except that (a) both conditions used three small bears, and 
(b) prior to the test trial, infants received two familiarization trials in which the status of each 
bear was established (Fig. 4).  
Authority condition. Infants in the authority condition first watched two identical 
familiarization trials; each trial was computer-controlled and lasted 38 s. To start, one bear (e.g., 
the yellow bear) was reading a book, while the other bear (e.g., the blue bear) was storing 
pompoms into a clear container; the bears’ activities and positions were counterbalanced across 
infants. Next, the red bear entered at the back of the apparatus, greeted the side bears, and then 
started giving two instructions, “Front!” and “Back!” Each instruction was accompanied by a 
distinct movement as the red bear spread or closed its arms, respectively. There were three cycles 
of the red bear’s instructions-movements. In each cycle, the side bears performed distinct actions 
upon hearing the instructions. Crucially, they did not imitate the actions of the red bear, which 
could have been interpreted as a bid for affiliation (e.g., Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum & Carpenter, 
2013; Over & Carpenter, 2015; Powell & Spelke, 2013). Instead, they turned their bodies 
towards the infant upon hearing “Front” and turned them towards the back wall of the apparatus 
upon hearing “Back”. To emphasize the contingency between the red bear’s instructions and the 
side bear’s actions (and hence the red bear’s psychological control over the side bears), a 3-s 
pause was introduced in the second cycle before each of the red bear’s instructions. During each 
pause, the side bears waited; they moved only in response to the red bear’s instruction. The last 
cycle was identical to the first, with a 1-s pause before each instruction. The modification to the 
second cycle thus served to rule out the possibility that the side bears simply got into a habit of 
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performing certain actions in the presence of the red bear. By having these actions occur at the 
pace set by the red bear (i.e., sometimes slow and sometimes fast), I could more convincingly 
make the case that infants were sensitive to the red bear’s control over the side bears’ actions. 
After the two familiarization trials, infants saw either the rectify event or the ignore 
event, as in Experiment 1. If infants were sensitive to control over others’ actions as a cue to 
leadership, then they should view the red bear as the leader and expect it to rectify as opposed to 
ignore the transgression by the wrongdoer. Hence, I predicted longer looking at the ignore than 
at the rectify event, as in the authority condition of Experiment 1. 
No-Authority condition. Infants in the no-authority condition watched two 38-s 
familiarization trials (Fig. 4) identical to those in the authority condition, with the following 
exception: after greeting the red bear and watching it perform the first cycle of instructions-
movements, each side bear resumed its initial activity (i.e., reading or storing pompoms) at a 
pace that was incongruent with the instructions-movements of the red bear. If infants viewed the 
three bears as belonging to the same group (they all greeted each other excitedly), and realized 
that the actions of the red bear did not modify those of the side bears, then perhaps infants would 
view the red bear as an equal-status member and hence would have no particular expectation 
about how it would respond to the wrongdoer’s transgression in the test trial. I, therefore, 
anticipated that infants in this condition would look about equally at the rectify and ignore 
events, as in the no-authority condition of Experiment 1.   
 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 37 healthy term infants, 16 male (M = 17 months, 15 days, range = 16 
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months, 20 day to 18 months, 22 days). Eight additional infants were tested but excluded because 
they cried (2), reached the maximum looking time allowed (5), or had a looking time in the final 
phase of the test trial that was over 3 standard deviations from the condition mean (1). Infants 
were assigned randomly to the authority (n = 20) and no-authority (n = 17) conditions. 
 
Apparatus and stimuli 
The apparatus and test stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1. Additional stimuli were 
used in the familiarization trials. On the placemat of one side bear, there were 6 pompoms (5 cm 
in diameter) arranged in two rows (left: orange, middle: green, right: pink) equidistant from each 
other. In front of this placemat there was a clear acrylic container (5 cm X 10 cm X 20.25 cm), in 
which the pompoms could be stored. On the placemat of the other side bear was an open 
children’s book (2 cm X 13.25 cm X 25.5 cm).  
 
Procedure 
 The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except for the addition of the two 
familiarization trials. Infants in both conditions were highly attentive during these trials and 
looked, on average, for 37.5/38 s. Infants were also highly attentive during the initial phase of the 
test trial; across conditions, infants looked, on average, for 39.5/40 s. Inter-observer agreement 
during the test trial averaged 94% per infant. 
 
Results   
As in Experiment 1, looking times during the final phase of the test trial (Fig. 3) were 
analyzed by means of an ANOVA with Condition (authority or no-authority) and Event (rectify 
or ignore) as between-subjects factors. The main effects of condition, F(1, 33) = 1.13, p = 0.296, 
and event, F(1, 33) = 2.81, p = 0.103, were not significant, but the Condition X Event interaction 
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was significant, F(1, 33) = 4.24, p = 0.047. Planned comparisons were conducted within each 
condition. In the authority condition, infants who saw the ignore event (M = 20.7, SD =12.1) 
looked reliably longer than those who saw the rectify event (M =11.2, SD =4.1), F (1, 33) = 7.73, 
p = 0.009. In the no-authority condition, in contrast, infants looked about equally at the two 
events (ignore: M =12.8, SD = 6.0, rectify: M =13.7, SD =4.5), F (1, 33) < 1. 
To examine whether we replicated the pattern of results from Experiment 1, we 
conducted an ANOVA with experiment (1 or 2), condition (authority or no-authority) and event 
(rectify or ignore) as between-subjects factors. The main effect of experiment was significant, 
F(1, 63) = 4.24, p = 0.043, with infants looking longer in Experiment 1 (M =18.1, SD =8.5) than 
in Experiment 2 (M =14.7, SD =8.2). This effect was no doubt due to the fact that infants in 
Experiment 2 received two familiarization trials prior to the test trial, whereas infants in 
Experiment 1 received no such trials. The analysis also yielded a main effect of event, F(1, 63) = 
4.55, p = 0.037, and a significant Condition X Event interaction, F(1, 63) = 10.95, p = 0.001. 
Neither the main effect of condition nor the Experiment X Condition X Event interaction was 
significant, both Fs(1, 63) <1. Together, these findings make clear that (1) infants have 
differential expectations about the response of leaders as opposed to equal-status members to 
transgressions, regardless of the cue by which leadership is marked, and (2) infants in 
Experiment 1 were not merely associating the red bear’s larger size with greater physical 
capability or agency. In Experiment 2, an equal-sized red bear controlled the actions of the side 
bears, and infants performed similarly. 
Discussion and Future Directions 
In two experiments, 16- to 18-month-old infants held differential expectations about the 
responses of a leader and an equal-status member who witnessed a transgression by a member of 
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their group towards another member of the group. Specifically, infants expected the leader to 
rectify as opposed to ignore the transgression, but they held no particular expectations about 
what the equal-status member would do. 
 One interpretation of these results might be that infants are construing the difference 
between leaders and equal-status members not in terms of obligation, but in terms of entitlement: 
leaders are typically entitled to more privileges (e.g., Fiske, 1992; Rai & Fiske, 2011), including 
the freedom to act as they see fit. The current study design cannot rule out this possibility, and 
future studies should. Essentially, one could ask: Would infants have the same expectation when 
the inequality occurred without a transgression? Imagine the following event sequence: when the 
leader joins the two dancing subordinates and announces “Toys!” (as in Experiments 1 and 2), 
only one bear answers excitedly “Yay!”, while the other replies, “No, thanks” shaking its head 
(as in politely declining).  Next, when the leader steps back to allow access, only the bear that 
was previously excited reaches for the toys. If infants think leaders are entitled to act freely, then 
they might still view the rectify event (when the toys are re-distributed between the subordinates) 
as expected, because the leader can modify the distribution of the two toys if he so wishes. If, 
however, infants are sensitive to situational constraints (only one bear was interested in the toys), 
then they might now look longer at the rectify event. This would suggest that infants view the 
leader’s re-distribution of the second toy as unnecessary and even officious or meddlesome, 
given that the subordinate receiving it had expressed no interest in it.  
Another issue regarding the positive results of the authority conditions in Experiments 1 
and 2 is whether infants view the rectify event as a punishment directed at the wrongdoer, or 
more broadly as an action meant to restore harmony within the group. Both could be duties of a 
leader. This is an interesting venue for future exploration because punishment is not restricted to 
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leaders (subordinates punish as well), whereas restoring the group’s harmony by communicating 
a standard of equality might be restricted to leaders. Imagine a modified rectify event in which 
the leader takes both toys away from the wrongdoer and gives them to the victim. This act is 
more likely to be interpreted as a punishment, because it preserves inequality between members 
of the group, albeit now favoring the victim, and it is unlikely to serve the purpose of truly 
restoring harmony. If infants interpreted the original rectify event (with one toy re-distributed to 
the victim) as an act of punishment, then they might also view this modified rectify event (with 
both toys re-distributed to the victim) as expected, and look about equally (and equally short) at 
both events. If, however, infants interpreted the original rectify event as an act intended to restore 
harmony, then they might look longer at this variation, because inequality remains, now favoring 
the victim.  
Finally, the negative results of the no-authority conditions in Experiments 1 and 2 make 
clear that infants do not possess an expectation that any individual should respond to harm or 
inequality inflicted on another individual. But how did infants reason about the actions of the 
equal-status observer? One possibility is that infants simply had no expectation about how the 
observer would respond to the wrongdoer’s transgression. Alternatively, infants might have been 
able to make sense of both test events. When shown the rectify event, infants might have 
understood that the observer wanted to correct the wrongdoer’s transgression and ensure that 
each subordinate member received an equal share of the toys, as in the authority condition. When 
shown the ignore event, infants might have understood that an equal-status observer might be 
apprehensive about rectifying the transgression in the presence of the wrongdoer (e.g., in fear of 
reprisals or other social costs imposed by the wrongdoer) and might accordingly elect to ignore 
the transgression instead. To test this possibility, one could present infants with similar rectify 
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and ignore events, except that the wrongdoer and victim would leave before the observer’s 
actions. After the wrongdoer obtains both toys, a bell would be rung, and the wrongdoer and the 
victim would announce, “I have to go, I’ll be back soon”. After they leave, the observer would 
rectify or ignore as in Experiments 1 and 2. If infants have no expectation about how an equal-
status observer should act when facing a transgression within its group, they should again look 
about equally at the rectify and ignore events. If, however, infants realize that equal-status 
members may sometimes find it difficult to act in the presence of antisocial members, then a 
different result might be found: when the wrongdoer and victim are absent (but will be back), 
infants may now expect the observer to rectify the wrongdoer’s actions and look longer if shown 
the ignore as opposed to the rectify event. It would be a first diagnostic test of whether infants 
have any expectations about an equal-status observer.  
If this test yields positive results, it would suggest that infants expect leaders to correct a 
transgression even if the wrongdoer is still present: an authority figure in a group may be obliged 
to rectify transgressions within the group, without overmuch concern for personal costs. Support 
for this view might come from additional conditions in which either the wrongdoer or the victim 
leaves when the bell is rung (not both). If the interpretation I suggested above is correct, infants 
might expect the equal-status observer to rectify the transgression as long the wrongdoer is 
absent. 
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CHAPTER 3: LEADERS REGULATE USE OF LIMITED RESOURCES FAIRLY  
 In the preceding chapter, we focused on responses to conflicts that arise within a group 
because of a member’s selfish tendencies. The data suggested that infants view resolving such 
conflicts and restoring group harmony as an obligation of a leader, but not necessarily of an 
equal-status member. Social conflict is even more likely to occur when resources are limited. In 
this chapter, we focus on infants’ expectations regarding fair procedures to regulate use of a 
limited resource within a group. If a single toy is available, and two group members would like 
to play with it, infants may have no expectation about whom the observer should give the toy to 
first: giving it to either member makes sense, as there is no obvious basis to choose between 
them. However, what if the observer knew that one group member had already had several turns 
at playing with the toy prior to the arrival of the second group member? Here I asked whether 
infants would expect a leader—but perhaps not an equal-status member—to take information 
about prior turns into account when deciding whom to give the toy to. Do infants have 
differential expectations about who in a group is likely to engage in such ‘record keeping’ and 
use this information when making decisions about who should have the next turn at a limited 
resource?  
 I explored this question with 20- to- 24-month-old infants. I chose to test a slightly older 
age group for two reasons. First, I marked leadership in this study by compliance with an implicit 
command that required some understanding of English, “Time for bed!” I did not use imperative 
language to signal the command (e.g., “Go to bed!”); instead, I built on a prior finding that 
infants this age understood that compliance was expected when a similar expression was used 
(“It’s time to clean up!”; Sloane et al., 2012). Second, I presented infants with a more complex 
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situation than that in chapter 2 because determining what outcome was fair required integrating 
information presented across trials. 
Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3, I tested whether 20- to 24-month-old infants have differential 
expectations about regulating fair access to a limited resource among group members. 
Specifically, would infants expect leaders, but not equal-status members, to use information 
about prior turns at a limited resource when deciding who should have the next turn?  
Since this experiment focused on the regulation of access to, or turns with, a limited 
resource, it seemed plausible that performance might be affected by infants’ prior amount of 
exposure to situations requiring sharing or taking turns at a coveted resource. During the second 
year of life, infants gradually begin to understand the relationship between possession, 
ownership, and sharing (e.g., Blake & Harris, 2009; Brownell, Iesue, Nichols, & Svetlova, 2013; 
Fasig, 2000; Ross, 2013); most of their conflicts with peers tend to be about control over 
resources (e.g., Caplan, Vespo, Pedersen & Hay, 1991; Hay & Ross, 1982; Ross, 2013). It is not 
until about the age of 5 years that children spontaneously take turns with peers in limited-
resource situations (e.g., Melis, Grocke, Kalbitz, & Tomasello, 2016; Zeidler, Herrmann, Haun, 
& Tomasello, 2016).  
Given these findings, it seemed plausible that infants who attended a daycare and 
routinely interacted with multiple peers might be more likely to encounter conflicts over limited 
resources and to understand the relevance of prior turns to how authority figures usually resolve 
these conflicts. Accordingly, I recruited two groups of infants in Experiment 3, one group who 
attended a daycare and one who did not. During their visit to the laboratory, parents filled out an 
informal Care Arrangement Questionnaire, which asked them to indicate (a) whether their child 
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was cared for by someone other than the parent, and if yes, (b) what type of care arrangement the 
child received and (c) how many peers were typically present in that setting. The daycare group 
was comprised of children who were cared for in daycare settings, with about 5 to 30 peers 
present. The no-daycare group was comprised of children who were cared for in home-settings 
by a parent, relative, family friend, or nanny, with about 0 to 4 peers present.    
 
Design 
Infants in each group were randomly assigned to an authority or a no-authority condition. 
All infants received three orientation trials, three familiarization trials, and one test trial. In the 
test trial, half the infants saw an old-recipient event, and half saw a new-recipient event.  
Authority condition. Infants watched interactions involving three different pig puppets 
of the same size: one wearing red accessories (henceforth “red”), one wearing yellow accessories 
(“yellow”), and one wearing black accessories (“black”). Infants first received three orientation 
trials (Fig. 5). At the start of each (20-s) trial, the red and yellow pigs protruded through small 
openings in the back wall of the apparatus (left and right positions were counterbalanced across 
infants) and danced gently from side to side. They were next joined by the black pig, who 
entered through a window in the left wall of the apparatus. In front of each of three pigs was a 
bed. The black pig then gave an implicit command, “Time for bed!” twice. The other pigs 
responded “Ok!” and lay down on their beds. After they did so, the black pig also lay down on 
its bed. We reasoned that upon seeing a puppet consistently give a command to other puppets, 
who then complied, infants might encode the puppet giving the commands as the leader. 
Next, infants received three familiarization trials (Fig. 6). These trials (20-s) involved 
only the leader and one of the subordinates, and the purpose of these trials was to establish that 
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one subordinate was given access to a toy rattle and used it multiple times. To start, the leader 
looked at (but did not reach for) a green rattle centered on the apparatus floor. Next, one 
subordinate (e.g., yellow) entered the scene and declared, “I want the toy!” The leader then 
picked up the rattle and placed it in front of the subordinate while saying, “Here you go!” The 
subordinate then picked up the rattle and played with it by tilting from side to side and causing it 
to rattle. All three familiarization trials were identical, with the same subordinate getting a turn at 
playing with the rattle in each trial. 
The test trial had an initial phase and a final phase. At the start of the (26-s) initial phase 
(Fig. 6), the leader was again alone and looking at the toy rattle on the apparatus floor. Next, 
both subordinates (yellow and red, in the same locations in the back wall as in the orientation 
trials) entered the scene and expressed interest in accessing the rattle (pig 1: “I want the toy!”, 
pig 2: “I want the toy, too!”, pig 2: “I want the toy!”, pig 1: “I want the toy, too!”). At this point, 
the trial progressed differently depending on which test event infants saw. In the old-recipient 
event, the leader handed the rattle to the pig that had previously used it in the familiarization 
trials. In the new-recipient event, the leader handed the rattle to the pig that had not used it 
before. Whichever subordinate received the rattle played with it for 6 seconds, while the other 
subordinate watched. Finally, all three pigs paused. During the final phase of the test trial, infants 
watched this paused scene until the trial ended.   
I reasoned that if infants (a) inferred in the orientation trials that the individual whose 
commands were consistently obeyed was the group’s leader and (b) expected the leader to ensure 
fair access to the toy in the test trial, by favoring the new recipient without a previous turn at 
playing with the toy, then infants should detect a violation when the leader favored the old 
recipient instead. Accordingly, I predicted that infants who saw the old-recipient event would 
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look reliably longer than those who saw the new-recipient event. I also hypothesized that infants 
in the daycare group might be more likely to show this looking pattern; a daycare setting where 
toys must be shared by many peers would likely increase infants’ opportunity to learn how 
leaders typically resolve these situations (i.e., by enforcing turn-taking).    
On the other hand, negative results were also possible.  For example, infants might ignore 
prior use and simply expect decisions about access to be made separately in each trial, based on 
however many subordinate members happened to be present (e.g., if only one member was 
present, it received the toy; if two members were present, the toy was given to either member at 
random). This would result in equal looking times at the two test events. I hypothesized that 
infants in the no-daycare group might show this pattern. As the settings in which they were cared 
for typically involved few peers, with less need for sharing resources, infants might not yet have 
had the opportunity to learn that for leaders, considerations of fairness extend to take in prior 
turns when settling conflicts over limited resources. 
No-Authority condition. This condition differed from the authority condition only in the 
orientation trials. In each orientation trial, a different pig gave commands to the other pigs. Thus, 
across the three orientation trials, all three pigs took turns at commanding the others to sleep; the 
order in which they did so was counterbalanced across infants. Infants then received the same 
familiarization and test trials as in the authority condition.  
I reasoned that if infants in the daycare and no-daycare groups interpreted the orientation 
trials as interactions among equal-status members (because no particular puppet gave commands 
consistently to the other puppets), then they might look equally at the old- and new-recipient 
events, albeit for somewhat different reasons. For the daycare group, the equal-status member 
might hand the toy to the new recipient out of a sense of fairness (taking into account prior 
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turns), or it might hand the toy to the old recipient because of the relationship that had developed 
between them over the course of the three familiarization trials. Contrary to leaders, who are 
expected to be impartial and avoid favoritism when interacting with subordinates (e.g., Fiske, 
1996; Tyler & Lind, 1992), interactions between equal-status members often reflect affiliative 
tendencies (e.g., preferring one group member over another). For the no-daycare group, the 
equal-status member might be either (a) randomly selecting the old or new recipient (since there 
was only one toy, nothing else could be done to satisfy fairness) or (b) favoring the pig with 
whom it had interacted in the familiarization trials. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 80 healthy term infants, 40 male (M = 22 months, 5 days, range = 20 
months, 7 days to 23 months, 28 days). An additional five infants were tested but excluded 
because they were fussy (4) or distracted (1). Equal numbers of infants (n = 40) were recruited 
for the daycare and no-daycare groups. In each group, infants were randomly assigned to the 
authority or the no-authority condition. Within each condition, half the infants saw the old-
recipient test event, and half saw the new-recipient test event. 
 
Apparatus and stimuli 
The apparatus in Experiment 3 was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2, with one 
exception: the back wall had two small openings, covered with fabric (through which puppets 
could appear), rather than one large opening. 
Two experimenters wearing cream shirts worked together to produce the events. One 
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experimenter operated the two different pig puppets (yellow and red) from the back wall (their 
positions in the back wall were counterbalanced across participants). The other experimenter 
operated the black pig puppet, which was always brought into the apparatus through the left 
window (this window was filled with a fringe curtain). Each pig had different colored 
accessories. The red pig had a red hat and bowtie, the yellow pig had a straw hat and yellow 
striped tie, and the black pig had a black hat and black necklace. All pig puppets were of equal 
size (23 cm X 20 cm X 18 cm). In the orientation trials, a small bed lay in front of each pig. Each 
bed was made of wood and covered with a blue fabric and light blue ‘pillow’ (1 cm X 9 cm X 8 
cm). In the familiarization and test trials, these beds were removed and a green maracas-shaped 
rattle (4 cm X 12 cm X 4 cm) was centered on the apparatus floor, approximately 41 cm in front 
of the black pig.  
 
Procedure 
 Prior to the test session, the parent was asked to fill out an informal Care Arrangements 
Questionnaire focusing on their infant’s regular care arrangement (as described previously). 
During the test session, the infant sat on the parent’s lap, centered in front of the apparatus; 
parents were instructed to remain silent and close their eyes during the test trial. During the 
familiarization and test trials, two naïve observers hidden on either side of the apparatus 
monitored the infant’s looking behavior. From their viewpoints, the observers could not 
determine whether the infant saw the old-recipient or the new-recipient event. In addition, to 
ensure that our primary observer was also naïve about whether the infant was assigned to the 
authority or no-authority condition (by hearing which puppet was giving the commands and 
which puppets were complying), only the secondary observer was present during the orientation 
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trials. Inter-observer agreement during the test trial was measured as the proportion of 100-ms 
intervals in which the observers agreed on whether or not the infant was looking at the event. 
Agreement among observers averaged 95% per infant. 
The orientation and familiarization trials had a fixed duration controlled by our computer 
program, and each ended after 20 seconds. Both groups were highly attentive during these trials. 
In the daycare group, infants looked on average 19.3 seconds and 19.5 seconds, respectively. In 
the no-daycare group, infants looked on average 19.7 seconds and 19.3 seconds, respectively. 
Looking times during the initial and final phases of the test trial were computed 
separately. Infants were highly attentive during the initial phase of the test trial; on average, they 
looked for 25.7/26 s in the daycare group, and 25.6/26 s in the no-daycare group. The final phase 
of the test trial ended when infants (a) looked away for 2 seconds after having looked for at least 
8 cumulative seconds or (b) looked for 45 cumulative seconds. Preliminary analysis of the test 
data in each group revealed no interaction of condition and event with infants’ sex. The data 
were therefore collapsed across sex in each group.  
 
Results 
Looking times during the final phase of the test trial (Fig. 7) were subjected to a three-
way ANOVA analysis with Group (daycare or no-daycare), Condition (authority or no-
authority), and Event (old-recipient or new-recipient) as between-subjects factors. The main 
effects of group, F(1, 72) = 0.12, p = 0.73, condition, F(1, 72) = 0.59, p = 0.44, and event, F(1, 
72) = 2.41, p = 0.12, were not significant. However, the Group X Condition X Event interaction 
was significant, F(1, 72) = 4.53, p = 0.03, indicating that within each group, looking times across 
conditions and events differed. To explore the nature of this interaction, we conducted a separate 
two-way ANOVA for each group, with condition and event as between-subjects factors.   
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Daycare group: The main effects of condition, F(1, 36) = 3.61, p = 0.07, and event, F (1, 
36) = 2.81, p = 0.10, were not significant. However, the Condition X Event interaction was 
significant, F(1, 36) = 6.70, p = 0.01. Planned comparisons revealed that in the authority 
condition, infants who saw the old-recipient event (M = 33.5, SD = 10.5) looked reliably longer 
than those who saw the new-recipient event (M = 19.7, SD = 8.6), F(1, 36) = 9.20, p < 0.005; in 
the no-authority condition, in contrast, infants looked about equally at the two events (old-
recipient: M = 19.0, SD = 8.9, new-recipient: M = 22.0, SD =12.3), F(1, 36) < 1.  In addition, 
infants in the authority condition looked reliably longer than infants in the no-authority condition 
at the old-recipient event, F(1, 36) = 10.16, p < 0.005.  
No-daycare group: The analysis yielded no significant effects, all Fs(1, 36) < 1, 
suggesting that infants in the two conditions tended to look equally at the old- and new-recipient 
events (authority: old-recipient, M = 23.3, SD = 11.3, new-recipient, M = 23.1, SD = 11.0; no-
authority: old-recipient, M = 27.7, SD = 13.6, new-recipient, M = 23.5, SD = 9.9). 
Across groups: A planned comparison between infants in both groups who were 
assigned to the authority condition and watched the old-recipient event indicated that infants in 
the daycare group looked reliably longer than their counterparts in the no-daycare group when 
the leader moved the rattle closer to the old recipient, F(1, 72) = 4.41, p = 0.04.   
The preceding results will, of course, need to be confirmed with additional samples of 
infants. Still, these results suggest tantalizing conclusions about the role of experience on infants’ 
expectations about how authority figures are likely to handle conflicts over limited resources. It 
seems plausible that with more children present, the probability of conflicts occurring over a 
limited resource becomes greater, giving children more opportunities to glean information about 
how authority figures typically resolve these conflicts—for example, by carefully tracking 
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children’s prior turns at the resource and ensuring equal and fair numbers of turns across 
children.  
 
Discussion and Future Directions 
In Experiment 3, we found that social experience might play an important role in infants’ 
reasoning about fair regulation of resource use within a group. Specifically, infants who were 
cared for in non-daycare settings where few or no other children were present, did not show 
differential expectations about how leaders and equal-status members would approach resource 
regulation: in both the authority and no-authority conditions, infants looked about equally 
whether the recipient was the pig who had had prior turns at playing with the toy (old-recipient 
event) or the pig who had not yet had a turn (new-recipient event). Conversely, infants who were 
cared for at a daycare where they routinely interacted with many children, did give evidence of 
holding diverging expectations for leaders and equal-status members: they expected the leader to 
give the toy to the pig who had not used it before (new-recipient event), but they held no 
particular expectation about which pig the equal-status member would give the toy to. How 
might social experiences shape expectations about resource regulation? Three broad possibilities 
are detailed below. 
Fairness. It seems plausible that being in an environment that affords social interactions 
with more children means more opportunities to observe or participate in conflicts over desirable 
but limited resources. Over time, infants may learn what types of considerations tend to guide 
authority figures’ decisions about resource regulation within the group. One such type of 
consideration is likely to be prior use, as authority figures typically insist on turn-taking: if a 
child has just had a turn at a resource, then another child who has not will be given a turn next. 
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Importantly, infants’ abstract concepts of fairness and authority should help them make sense of 
the authority figures’ actions (i.e., should help them build an explanation for these actions). 
When there are two toys and two recipients, fairness dictates that each recipient should have one 
toy; but when there is only one toy, turn-taking becomes a good way of ensuring a fair outcome, 
and it makes sense that an authority figure would choose this course of action. 
When infants routinely interact with few other children, resources in everyday 
interactions may not be as limited, and conflicts may occur less often. Thus, infants may not yet 
understand the relevance of prior use for resolving conflicts over limited resources. This analysis 
suggests that in Experiment 3 infants in the no-daycare group did apply a notion of fairness to 
the actions of the protagonist (leader or equal-status member) giving access to the toy, but this 
reasoning was fairly shallow: there was only one toy, and two pigs who wanted it, so all that the 
protagonist could do was to give the toy to either pig at random. This interpretation is consistent 
with prior findings that infants in the second year of life possess an abstract sense of fairness and 
expect fair outcomes in the distribution of windfall resources, rewards for efforts, punishments 
for misdeeds, and so on (e.g., Geraci & Surian, 2011; Meristo & Surian, 2013; Meristo et al., 
2015; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2001; Sloane et al., 2012). Future studies could explore more 
directly this “shallow versus rich” fairness interpretation by contrasting directly resource 
regulation when resources are limited (one rattle for two pigs always) and when resources are 
sufficient (two rattles for two pigs). For example, imagine that we first familiarize infants with 
the two pigs requesting the rattle. At this point, handing the rattle to either pig would be 
appropriate. However, in the next scene, the prior recipient either brings into the scene the rattle 
it had received previously (now two rattles are available for two pigs) or does not (one rattle 
available for two pigs). If infants in the no-daycare group had a shallow sense of fairness that 
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enabled them to reason about situations with sufficient, but not limited, resources, they should 
look longer at an old-recipient event in the scene with sufficient but not limited resources, 
whether the protagonist is a leader or not.  
The preceding speculations are consistent with analyses of knowledge acquisition in 
other domains of infant cognition. For example, in the domain of physical reasoning, infants 
form event categories (e.g., occlusion, support, containment, and collision events), and for each 
category gradually identify the features that are causally relevant for interpreting and predicting 
outcomes (e.g., Baillargeon et al., 2009, 2011, 2012). In the case of containment events, for 
example, infants learn that the relative width of the containee with respect to the opening of the 
container determines whether the containee can fit through this opening and be lowered inside 
the container. In the same vein, one could speculate that in reasoning about fairness in the 
context of resource regulation, infants come with experience to identify prior use as a relevant 
feature in a leader’s fair decision.  
In the domain of physical reasoning, infants who have not yet identified a specific feature 
as relevant to an event category can often be primed to attend to and encode this feature via 
simple experimental manipulations; infants’ physical knowledge then enables them to use this 
information to reason about the unfolding event. These results raise an interesting question for 
future research: Could infants who have not yet learned to attend to prior-use information in 
reasoning about fair access to a limited resource be primed to attend to this information? Would 
they then expect this information to guide a leader’s decision about who should have a turn at the 
resource next? 
Favoritism. Another possible interpretation of our results is that all infants—both those 
in the no-daycare and those in the daycare group—understood that prior turns at the toy were 
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relevant to fair decisions about who should have the toy next. However, this consideration of 
fairness was pitted against one of favoritism. Specifically, it could be that infants in the no-
daycare group assumed that the protagonist (leader or equal-status) liked the old recipient to 
whom it repeatedly gave the toy in the familiarization trials. In the old-recipient test event, this 
consideration of friendship overruled fairness; in the new-recipient event, the reverse was true. 
Because infants could build an explanation for either event, they tended to look equally 
regardless of who received the toy in either condition. 
In contrast, infants in the daycare group expected the leader to overcome this positive 
inclination toward the old recipient and to give the toy to the new recipient, in accordance with 
procedural fairness. In other words, such infants understood that it is important for leaders or 
authority figures to be objective or impartial; an equal-status member may follow its heart and 
favor a friend, but a leader must be objective and ensure that all members of the group have fair 
access to a desirable resource. 
This interpretation is quite different from the one suggested in the last section. According 
to this last interpretation, infants in the no-daycare group had a more limited understanding of 
fairness: they did not realize that prior use is relevant to fair access to a resource. According to 
this new interpretation, they had a more limited understanding of authority and did not 
understand that leaders cannot favor some members of the group over others. 
Future research can examine which of these two interpretations is more likely. To do so 
one would have to eliminate the possibility of a “close” relationship between the protagonist 
(leader or equal-status) and one of the recipients. One way might be to introduce a fourth 
subordinate who grants access to the toy during the familiarization trials, while the target 
protagonist (leader or equal-status) is present and tracking the use of the resource over time. In 
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test, when both potential recipients request the toy, one could be certain that the target 
protagonist had no personal relationship or prior interactions with any of these recipients. 
Another way might be to have only one familiarization trial, which would make it less probable 
that a “close” relationship between the protagonist (leader or equal-status) and one of the 
recipients could have been developed. In either variation, if infants in the no-daycare group still 
expected the leader to give the toy randomly to either recipient (as there would be only one toy 
and two possible recipients), it would suggest that they did not yet understand the relevance of 
prior turns (many or only one) to decisions about fair access to limited resources. If infants in the 
daycare group preserved the same pattern of results, we could be more certain such infants 
understand that a “close” relationship does not play a role in leaders’ decisions about fair access 
to limited resources: whether or not they have the opportunity to develop this relationship, fair 
decisions must be based on prior use of the resource.   
Equal interactions. In the two previous sections, we suggested that infants in the daycare 
group held a more sophisticated notion of fairness (prior turns matter) or authority (leaders must 
rank fairness over personal affection). However, it might be suggested that our results are open 
to a simpler, low-level interpretation: perhaps infants with more daycare experience simply 
expected the leader to interact with each subordinate equally (e.g., “Good morning, Tom!”, 
“Good morning, Jerry!”). Because the leader had already interacted with the old recipient, it was 
important for the leader to now interact with the new recipient. Infants in the no-daycare group 
with less social experience held no such expectation and hence looked equally at both events.  
One way to evaluate this alternative interpretation would be to change the nature of the 
resource available in the test trial. To illustrate, if one of two children played for hours with a 
ball, and now both children were asking to play on the computer, the use of the ball would bear 
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no relevance to the decision about using the computer: either child could use the computer. 
However, if one of them had already played for hours on the computer before, then the decision 
would be driven by this information. In contrast, the obligation “to interact equally” places no 
particular importance on the nature of resource that is being requested; this resource only serves 
to facilitate the interaction. Thus, infants should expect the leader to give the resource in the test 
trial to the pig who was absent in the familiarization trials (and hence the protagonist of limited 
prior interactions) rather than to the pig who was present in the familiarization trials.  
To examine this, we could first establish that one pig is the leader of the other two pigs, 
as in Experiment 3. Then we could assign infants either to a same-toy condition or to a different-
toys condition. The same-toy condition would be exactly like the authority condition in 
Experiment 3. In the different-toys condition, the toy in the familiarization trials would be 
different than the toy in the test trial (e.g., a pink rattle cube in the familiarization trials, and a 
green toy rattle in the test trial). If infants view the action of the leader as an obligation to be fair 
in resource regulation specifically, then we predict that changing the toy from the familiarization 
trials to the test trial should eliminate our effect. In other words, infants should be oblivious 
about whether the leader hands the new toy to the previous recipient of a different toy, or to the 
new recipient. Hence, infants should look about equally whether they are shown the old- or the 
new-recipient event.  
Summary. In short, the results of Experiment 3 raise many interesting questions for 
future research. First, it will be important to confirm these findings with additional daycare and 
no-daycare groups. Assuming positive results, it will be important to better understand how 
infants in a daycare who interact with many peers, construe leaders and their obligations toward 
subordinates. In particular, it will be helpful to inquire more about the daycare setting (e.g., 
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children’s actual experience with limited resource conflicts, what messages they might hear, and 
so on) to draw firmer conclusions about the expectations manifested in Experiment 3. One could 
imagine studying infants longitudinally, comparing their performance at this task when they just 
start to attend a daycare and at a number of time points afterwards. Finally, it will also be 
important to study infants who are cared for in settings with fewer peers present to determine 
what expectations they are still in the process of acquiring and what interventions might support 
this acquisition process (e.g., could manipulating the number of potential recipients make the 
conflict over limited resources more salient for infants who routinely interact with fewer peers? 
Would exposure to contrasting examples of leader and equal-status member handling limited 
resource conflicts help infants form the same expectations as those who have daycare 
experience?).   
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION	
The studies in my dissertation explored whether (1) infants are sensitive to authority-
based asymmetrical social relations involving a leader and subordinates, and in particular (2) 
whether infants have expectations about the moral obligations of leaders towards members of 
their group.  
 In recent years, there have been a number of reports indicating that infants and young 
children are sensitive to asymmetrical social relations based on coercive power (often referred to 
as ‘dominance’), relying on a number of cues, such as physical supremacy or goal achievement 
(e.g., Charafeddine et al. 2015, 2016; Gazes, et al., 2015; Gülgöz & Gelman, 2016; Pun, et al., 
2016; Mascaro & Csibra, 2012, 2014; Thomsen, et al., 2011). The majority of these reports have 
presented infants and children with protagonists that compete over a common goal (e.g., a 
desired object, a decision about which activity to engage in), and whichever protagonist prevails 
is identified as the ‘leader’. In this kind of asymmetrical social relations, a leader has no 
functional role, and is often a privileged protagonist, that achieves its personal goals. Not 
surprisingly, when given a choice of whom to affiliate with (via resource allocation), 
preschoolers favor the leader (Charafeddine et al., 2016).  
Less attention has been devoted to other forms of asymmetrical social relations, such as 
those based on legitimate power or authority, in which a leader has a functional role or duty, of 
ensuring the cohesiveness of its group and protecting its members. In my dissertation, I focused 
on early expectations with respect to this kind of asymmetrical social relations. My general 
approach across all experiments had been to present infants with live events involving 
interactions among a group of three puppets, that either clearly involved a leader (authority 
condition) or no leader (no-authority condition). Leadership was marked either by large relative 
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size of one puppet compared to the others (Experiment 1), or by compliance with commands 
(Experiments 2 and 3). The comparison between the authority and no-authority conditions in 
each study allowed me to examine whether infants have differential expectations (as indexed by 
looking time differences) as to how a leader versus an equal-status member in a group might act 
in situations that could violate group harmony, and thus hint at unique responsibilities of a leader 
towards subordinates.  
In chapter 2, I explored whether infants in the second year of life had expectations about 
how a leader versus an equal-status member would act when witnessing a transgression within 
their group. Specifically, I presented infants with a scenario in which either a leader or an equal-
status member made sufficient resources (e.g., two identical toys) accessible to two group 
members, one of whom selfishly took all resources to itself. 16- to-18-month-old infants 
expected a leader observing this transgression to rectify it, and detected a violation if the leader 
ignored it, but they held no such expectations from an equal-status member observing this 
transgression. These results held regardless of the cue by which leadership was marked 
(Experiment 1: larger physical size; Experiment 2: having control over others’ actions). This 
finding is important because infants use physical size as a cue for leadership in coercive power 
asymmetries, where one agent prevails over another. Here I show they use it as a cue for 
leadership in authority-based asymmetries, that do not involve any competition, but resemble 
more the difference in size that most authority figures have relative to infants and children (e.g., 
parent-child, teacher-student). Experiments 1-2 thus suggest, that infants this age, view rectifying 
transgressions within the group, as an obligation or responsibility of a leader, but not necessarily 
of an equal-status member.  
A number of interesting questions remain for future investigation. First, could it be that 
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infants also ascribe duties to tyrants (i.e., leaders in coercive power asymmetries), but understand 
that tyrants might not fulfill these duties, or may simply abuse the power bestowed upon them? 
Experiments 1-2 did not test this possibility, as we had focused on leaders in authority-based 
asymmetries, but one could easily imagine replacing such leaders with tyrants (i.e., familiarizing 
infants to a dominant protagonist that exercises coercive power over subordinates), and then ask 
whether infants expect tyrants to rectify transgressions they witness within their group. Second, 
were infants’ expectations regarding the actions of the leader reflecting responsibilities of leaders 
towards their group, or simply an expectation for increased agency that leaders might have 
compared to subordinates? According to the latter interpretation, the act of rectifying is 
perceived as more agentive than the act of ignoring and infants might associate the agentive act 
more with a leader than with a subordinate. If true, one would expect infants to look longer at the 
rectify event in the no-authority condition as opposed to the authority condition, yet this was not 
the case: infants looked comparably short at the rectify event in both conditions, in each 
experiment. Still, to further rule this interpretation out, one could change the context within 
which the same rectify and ignore actions take place, and examine whether infants display the 
same pattern of results or not. For example, if a group member obtained all resources, while the 
other expressed no interest in them, there would be no need to ‘rectify’, and infants would look 
long at this “more agentive” event.  
In chapter 3, I explored whether infants in the second year of life had expectations about 
how a leader versus an equal-status member would regulate resources within their group. 
Specifically, infants watched a scenario in which two group members requested one unavailable 
toy, and either a leader or an equal-status member who happened to have had access to it, had to 
decide whom should receive it. Critically, infants were given evidence that one group member 
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had used the toy in three prior occasions. I asked whether infants had differential expectations 
about fair resource regulation among group members, taking into account prior use. It seemed 
plausible that infants who interact routinely with many peers, might be more likely to encounter 
conflicts over limited resources, where regulation of turns is called for. It was an open question 
whether infants’ expectations would be associated or even explained by having relevant social 
experience. To this end, I had recruited two groups of infants: those who attend a daycare with 
many other peers present and those who are cared for in home settings with few to no peers 
present. I found that, in this context, infants’ social experience might indeed play an important 
role. 20- to 24-month-old infants who were cared for on a regular basis in home settings with few 
peers present (i.e., up to four) had no expectations about how leaders and equal-status members 
would regulate limited resources. In contrast, infants who attended a daycare with many peers 
(i.e., five or more) had diverging expectations for leaders and equal-status members: they 
expected the leader to give the toy to a subordinate who had not used it before, but held no 
particular expectation about whom an equal-status member would give the toy to. 
What exactly are infants gleaning from their care setting that makes it possible (or not) 
for them to reason differently about the actions of leaders and equal-status members in the 
context of limited-resource situations? At present, we speculate that settings that afford 
interactions with many peers provide exposure to conflicts over limited resources and the ways 
by which members of different status in a group handle these conflicts, but we have no direct 
quantitative or qualitative evidence (e.g., how many conflicts infants experience, what messages 
they hear from authority figures and peers in these situations) that bears on this question. To the 
extent that these findings replicate, and the relationship between social experience and reasoning 
about fair regulation of limited resources is further clarified it would be interesting to examine 
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cross-culturally. On the one hand, if care settings provide simply more opportunities to engage in 
and observe social conflicts over limited resources, where authority figures intervene to resolve 
such conflicts, we would obtain very similar results across cultures. On the other hand, cultures 
differ in how they rank certain social concerns over others (e.g., in-group loyalty vs. 
indiscriminate fairness, respect of authority over personal autonomy) and if these are 
communicated early enough in life, we may obtain very different results across cultures. For 
example, Japanese preschool teachers do not intervene to the same extent as their American 
counterparts when conflicts arise between preschoolers, and they encourage children to resolve 
conflicts on their own (e.g., Killen & Sueyoshi, 1995). Arguably, this and other cultural 
differences in limited-resource conflict resolution (e.g., Zeidler et al., 2016) are documented in 
older children than those I studied. It is very much an open question of how early culture shapes, 
if at all, infants’ expectations about leaders and equal-status members in this context.  
 Together, Experiments 1-3 suggest that infants in the second year of life are (1) sensitive 
to authority-based asymmetrical relations involving a leader and subordinates, and in particular 
(2) possess expectations about the unique responsibilities of a leader towards its group. I focused 
on two such responsibilities: rectifying transgressions and regulating fairly the use of limited 
resources within the group. One might wonder why infants ascribe such responsibilities uniquely 
to a leader. At first glance, this might seem inconsistent with the idea that group membership 
marks interpersonal obligations: members of the same social group should treat each other fairly 
and refrain from harming one another, and even preschoolers manifest this reasoning (e.g., 
Rhodes & Chalik, 2013). However, as adults, we also know that equal-status members may 
sometimes be driven by social considerations, such as siding with a bully or preferring to help an 
individual with whom you have a “close” relationship over another individual. The negative 
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results across all experiments, when an equal-status member’s interventions are in question (no-
authority condition) may be taken to mean that infants acknowledge these considerations too. 
Our positive findings when a leader’s interventions are in question (authority condition) suggest 
that, like adults, infants might expect leaders to be impartial in their dealings with subordinates, 
despite being exposed to the same kind of considerations.  
The studies in this dissertation constitute a first exploration of infants’ expectations about 
authority-related interactions. Nevertheless, important issues remain to be addressed in future 
research. First, it would be important to obtain additional evidence that infants view leaders’ 
actions as obligatory and not merely permissible. Studies of infants are inherently challenging in 
that they cannot give as definitive of an answer as we could obtain with adults or children. 
However, one way to circumvent these limitations is to design scenarios in which we introduce 
situational factors that could modify infants’ initial expectations about leaders and subordinates. 
One example I mentioned previously: leaders are not expected to redistribute unequal resources, 
when it is clear that only one subordinate was interested in them. Leaders are only expected to 
redistribute unequal resources that were obtained as a result of a transgression: two subordinates 
were interested in these resources, but one acted selfishly. Second, it would be important to 
understand what role does social experience play in shaping some authority-related expectations, 
but not others. Recall, that infants’ expectations about regulation of limited resources differed 
between infants who attend a daycare and those who are cared for in home settings. Third, 
understanding how early is the sensitivity to authority-based social asymmetrical relations, 
would shed light on whether different kinds of social power coexist early in life, or whether 
social power is slowly differentiated across development. Recall that infants are sensitive to 
coercive-based power asymmetries within the first year of life (e.g., Gazes et al., 2016; Pun et 
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al., 2016; Thomsen et al., 2011), and my dissertation focused on infants within the second year 
of life and showed sensitivity to authority-based asymmetrical relations. Finally, exploring what 
other unique responsibilities or obligations infants ascribe to leaders in their dealings with 
subordinates (e.g., protection) and what boundaries to such responsibilities exist (e.g., leaders 
have responsibilities to members of their own group, but not other groups) are also important 
venues for future research. 
Although many existing questions remain to be answered, the studies in my dissertation 
lend support to the “broad view” of morality in its suggestion that the “initial draft” of moral 
cognition, present in infancy, may include abstract predispositions towards moral principles that 
go beyond fairness and no-harm, such as authority: subordinates should respect leaders, and 
leaders have moral obligations towards subordinates (e.g., Fiske, 1992; Graham et al., 2013; 
Haidt & Graham, 2006; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Shweder et al., 1997).  
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FIGURES 
 
    
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Puppets used in the Authority Condition (left) and No-Authority Condition (right) of 
Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, only the equal-sized bear puppets were used (right). 
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Fig. 2. Test events in the Authority Condition in Experiment 1. At the start of the test trial (top 
row), two bear puppets are seen tilting as though dancing. They are joined by a larger bear that 
carries a tray with two toys, allowing the bears access to the toys. Both side bears excitedly 
approach the tray. However, one bear (‘wrongdoer’) selfishly takes both toys and places them on 
its placemat, while the other bear (‘victim’) returns emptyhanded. In the Rectify Event (middle 
row), the large bear, approaches the wrongdoer, takes one of its cubes and places it on the 
victim’s placemat. Next, the large bear takes the tray and leaves the scene. In the Ignore Event 
(bottom row), the large bear approaches the wrongdoer, inspects its placemat and then 
approaches the victim and inspects its placemat, before taking the tray and leaving the scene. 
Note: in the No-Authority Condition (not depicted here) the events were identical, except that the 
bear that brings the tray in from the back of the apparatus is of equal size to the side bears.  
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Fig. 3. Mean looking times (in seconds) at the Ignore and Rectify events within the Authority 
and No-Authority conditions, in Experiment 1 (left) and Experiment 2 (right). The error bars 
represent standard errors, and the asterisk denotes a significant difference (p < 0.05).  
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Fig. 4. Familiarization trial in Experiment 2. In the Authority Condition (top row), two bear 
puppets are engaged in activities (one bear reads a book; another bear stores pompoms in a 
container). Next, they are joined by an equal-sized bear, that makes two announcements, 
accompanied by distinct movements (“Front!” while opening its arms, “Back!” while closing its 
arms). Upon hearing these announcements, the side bears modify their behavior (turn to face the 
infant, or to face the back of the apparatus, respectively). This sequence is repeated twice more. 
In the No-Authority Condition (bottom row), the events are similar, except that the side bears do 
not modify their behavior upon hearing the announcements. During the first round, they simply 
watch, during the remaining rounds they resume their prior activities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  59 
 
 
Fig. 5. Orientation trials in Experiment 3. At the start of the orientation trial, two pig puppets are 
seen tilting as though dancing. They are joined by a third pig from the side of the apparatus and 
the latter gives them an order (“Time for bed! Time for bed!”), and they immediately comply by 
each responding “Ok!”, and then laying down on their respective beds, as though sleeping. In the 
Authority condition, infants see three trials in which the pig at the apparatus side window gives 
the order and the others comply. In the No-Authority condition, infants see three different 
orientation trials: in each, a different pig gives the order and the others comply. That is, across 
the different orientation trials, the pigs take turns at giving orders and complying.  
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Fig. 6. Familiarization trials (top row) and Test trial by event (middle and bottom rows) in 
Experiment 3. At the start of the familiarization trials, a rattle is on the apparatus floor and the 
side pig is seen at the side window (this pig is either the leader or the subordinate). Next, an 
additional pig enters from the back wall (the pig and its position are counterbalanced across 
infants), and declares “I want the toy!”. The side pig then replies “Here you go!” and moves the 
rattle within access to the pig at the back. The back pig then picks the rattle up, and tilts with it 
three times as though playing. The trial then ends.  All infants receive three identical 
familiarization trials. The test trials start out similarly, except that now two pigs enter from the 
back of the apparatus and express interest in obtaining the rattle (Pig 1: “I want the toy!”, Pig 2: 
“I want the toy, too!”). The side pig then moves the rattle within access of either the pig who had 
received the rattle in the preceding familiarization trials (Old-recipient event) or the pig who had 
not been present before and thus has not received the rattle before (New-recipient event). Within 
each condition, half of the infants see the Old-recipient event and half the New-recipient event.  
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Fig. 7. Mean looking times (in seconds) at the Old-recipient and New-recipient events within the 
Authority and No-Authority conditions, for infants who attend a daycare (left) and those who do 
not (right). The error bars represent standard errors, and the asterisk denotes a significant 
difference (p < 0.05).  
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